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The emotional and political power of images of suffering:  





Chapter in: Stephen Gibson (ed.). Discourse, peace, and conflict: Discursive psychology 








On September 2, 2015, the body of the three-year-old Syrian boy Alan Kurdi washed up on a 
beach near the resort town of Bodrum in western Turkey. The boy had drowned earlier that morning, 
alongside his five-year-old brother Galib and mother Rehan, when the small inflatable boat in which 
they tried to reach the Greek island of Kos, capsized shortly after setting off on the precarious nigh-
time voyage.1    
Alan Kurdi’s name and tragic fate would probably have remained unknown to the wider 
world were it not for the series of photographs of the boy’s dead body taken by the Turkish journalist 
Nilüfer Demir. Although Demir took several dozen photographs of the aftermath of the boating 
tragedy, two images (of which there are several versions) captured the imagination of the public: one 
was of the boy’s body lying face down in the surf, and the other of a Turkish policeman cradling the 
lifeless toddler in his arms.  
Mainly through the power of Twitter and other social media platforms, these photographs 
became an instant internet sensation, reaching over 20 million users in less than 24 hours (D’Orazio, 
2016). Instrumental in their global diffusion was widespread coverage in the mainstream media, 
which devoted attention not just to the boy’s fate and the broader refugee crisis, but also the 
seemingly unprecedented impact of the photographs on public imagination and political discourse, 
and the ethical issues surrounding their publication. Within days, the death of Alan Kurdi became a 
potent symbol of the plight of refugee children, and a reminder of the, at least temporary, political 
power of visual images.  
The role of photographs as vehicles for imagining and remembering war and notable peace-
time disasters, is well documented. Since the early 20th Century, dramatic events have been frequently 
represented through symbolic and poignant images that captured (but also produced and perpetuated) 
what was deemed to be the essence of human suffering (Zelizer, 2004, Sontag, 2003). However, the 
impact of the Kurdi images was seen by many as novel and unique. In the modern, digital age, defined 
by the ubiquity of the camera, the hyperproduction of visual images and their instant dissemination 
via the internet, it seemed remarkable that a single photographed event was still able to provoke such 
outpouring of sympathy and generate a sense of common purpose. Thus, many saw the responses to 
the death of Alan Kurdi as a radically new phenomenon, the marker of a new ‘regime of visuality’ for 
the social media age, and a new form of global citizenship exercised through an internet ‘meme’, 
through an image gone ‘viral’ (Goriunova & Vis, 2015).  
                                                          
1 The deceased boy’s name was initially reported as Aylan Kurdi, before it was changed to Alan, the correct 
transliteration of the Kurdish name. This chapter will refer to the boy as Alan throughout, except when quoting 
from sources where the different spelling appears in the original.   
Please note that this is the version of the chapter accepted for publication, but before copy editing 
or typesetting. Thus, this version may not exactly replicate the authoritative document published 




Responses to the publication of the photographs of Alan Kurdi’s body touch upon issues that 
are of intrinsic interest to peace psychologists. First is the apparent emotional power attributed to the 
photographs. Responses from journalists, politicians, representatives of advocacy groups, ordinary 
members of public, and so on, especially in the west, were replete with references to emotional states 
provoked by the images – shock, outrage, compassion – but also bodily reactions – the sense of being 
‘punched in the stomach’, ‘gut-wrenched’, ‘heart-wrenched’, ‘sickened’, ‘moved to tears’, etc. These 
strong, affective reactions were, for the most part, treated as natural, involuntary responses to the sight 
of the dead boy, reinforcing the widely-held belief that visual images, more so than other modes of 
representation (news reports, documentary evidence, or testimonies) have the power to elicit 
emotions, and move the audience on an instinctive, ‘visceral’ level (e.g. Butler, 2007, Goldberg, 1991, 
Sontag, 2003, Zelizer, 2004).  
The second and related issue is that the emotional experiences, or, more specifically, the 
publicly avowed claims to those experiences, were as much about social relationships, identity and 
norms that govern pro-social behaviour and civic responsibility, as about internal mental states. An 
imagined, transnational ‘community of mourning’ (Kear & Steinberg, 1999) formed around a shared 
cluster of emotions, and did so in a way that was directly political. The boy’s death was a summons to 
do something, or at least to take a stance.  
The present chapter looks more closely at the link between visual images of human suffering, 
emotions and political mobilisation. How do we account for this, seemingly inevitable, link? Also, 
how are images constituted as emotionally and politically moving, and how does an instance of 
suffering become a symbol for public consumption? Finally, what is it specifically about the images 
of Alan Kurdi’s dead body that made them uniquely newsworthy, affecting, and recognisable as a 
source of emotional investment? 
The starting point of the present analysis is the discursive psychological approach to the study 
of emotion. Ever since the late 1980s, discursive psychologists have argued that verbal or embodied 
expressions of feelings should be regarded not as more or less accurate descriptions of a 
corresponding internal, mental state, but as discursive phenomena and social acts. When people use 
emotion words, when they avow, describe, ascribe, deny, or account for emotions, their own and those 
of other people, they are doing socially and rhetorically meaningful things (Edwards, 1997, 1999, 
Harré, 1987, Harré and Gillett, 1994, see also Hepburn, 2004, Wetherell, 2012, Childs & Hepburn, 
2015). For instance, the claim to have been ‘upset’ or ‘made angry’ by something, or that someone 
has acted ‘emotionally’ carries specific moral weight in the context of an argument and can be 
mobilised to justify or contest a position or interpretation, manage accountability, persuade others, 
and so on (Potter, 2012). The focus of much discursive psychological work on emotion has been on 
how the rich thesaurus of emotion terms is deployed in everyday, often mundane, situations to 
manage some relevant social, or interactional, ‘business’.  
The present chapter, however, seeks to move beyond this kind of ‘micro’ analysis of 
discourse, centred on the occasioned use of emotion terms. Common-sense understanding of 
emotions, and the normative order that governs their public display and rhetorical use – what 
Wetherell (2012, p. 93) calls the ‘lay ethnopsychologies of emotion’ –  are embedded in structured, 
but also inherently argumentative, interpretative frameworks and social practices which configure 
human experience (also Wetherell, 1998). Examining these frameworks and practices requires a shift 
away from looking at specific instances of how people use the vocabulary of feelings to manage 
accountability and negotiate their way through the prevailing moral order, to exploring why, in a 
specific social, cultural and historical context, certain kinds of emotions or emotional responses are 
constituted as relevant, and recognised as an appropriate (albeit contestable) resource for ‘doing’ 
things. Or indeed why some objects, such as photographs, or events, such as a death, are constructed 
as ‘shocking’, ‘heart-breaking’, or ‘harrowing’. Crucially, this broader, ‘macro’ analysis does not 
preclude analysing the situated use of emotion terms and details of rhetoric. On the contrary it 




histories and conventional and communal powers weave in and out of the local order’ and permeate 
the texture of everyday talk, and experience (Wetherell, 2012, p.100; also Wetherell, 1998).  
The present chapter will, therefore, use the Kurdi photographs to explore the culturally 
specific conventions and codes through which the assumption about the emotional and political power 
of images, and specifically these images is constituted, and maintained as part of the ideological 
common sense. The specific focus of the chapter is spectatorial sympathy, as a distinct social practice 
which mediates the relevance of particular emotions and emotional reactions to images of suffering, 
and through which certain images are constituted as topics of humanitarian concern.  
In examining the impact of the Kurdi photographs, we will also take a road less travelled in 
discursive psychology and consider the possibilities of extending this approach more directly towards 
the study of visual material. Historically, analyses of discourse have privileged talk and text as the 
‘primary arena for human action, understanding and intersubjectivity’ (Potter, 2012, p. 114), 
acknowledging visual material solely as a topic of conversation. Edwards & Middleton’s (1988) 
analysis of conversational remembering around family snapshots is a relevant example. In the study, 
the authors showed that looking through, and talking about family photographs provides a rich social 
and communicative setting within which children develop the skills of joint, conversational 
remembering and learn how to ‘take meaning’ from a photograph. However, while Edwards & 
Middleton (1988, p.7) acknowledge that photographs are ‘semiotically and culturally meaningful 
things’ whose form, content, creation, and usage are regulated by a set of culturally specific 
conventions, their analysis focused entirely on conversations about photographs. The family 
snapshots were neither shown, nor examined. They were occasionally described, with the descriptions 
restricted to those features that were attended to by the participants. The emphasis was, therefore, on 
photographs as a ‘rich stimulant of joint remembering’ (Middleton & Edwards, 1988, p.7), without 
acknowledging that the photographs themselves (i.e. their content, form and composition, and their 
existence as material objects), as well as the complex social practices involved in their creation and 
preservation, are also constitutive of, and intrinsic to, the activity of joint, family remembering.    
The reluctance within discursive psychology to engage more directly with visual material can 
be attributed to the fact that its theoretical, philosophical and empirical roots lie in traditions and 
approaches that focus on written and spoken language and offer tools for their analysis. Also, as Frith 
et al. (2005) point out, there is a deeply entrenched belief within psychology more generally that the 
polysemic nature of images and the subjective nature of what Stuart Hall (1973) calls their 
‘connotative code’, makes them less amenable to systematic, empirical examination of the kind that 
might be possible with verbal data. The assumed ‘subjective’ nature of images is, arguably, why talk 
about images is deemed such a useful tool in the study of subjectivity (Reavey & Johnson, 2008).  
Yet when examining discourses surrounding iconic images of human suffering, the neglect of 
visual analysis becomes hard to justify. How can we study the emotional and political power of 
images without analysing photographs themselves, without examining their aesthetic features, their 
symbolism and connotative force, or without scrutinising what they show and what they conceal? 
After all, visual methodologies developed over the past half century, which ushered in a ‘pictorial 
turn’ in arts and humanities (Mitchell, 1994) have supplied ample evidence of the benefits of 
engaging in interpretation of symbols, cultural signs, and meanings in visual texts, particularly when 
unpicking the ideological power of images (e.g. Barthes, 2000, 2009, Berger, 2013, Hall, 1973, 
Sontag, 1977, 2003, Helmers & Hill, 2004, p.19-20). More recently, several authors have emphasised 
the inherently performative nature of photography, arguing that visual images are themselves 
rhetorical and action-oriented; they are stances in an argument, deployed, often alongside words, to 
get things done (Ash, 2005, Levin, 2009, Taylor, 2003, Azoulay, 2008). So, the present chapter can be 
seen as a preliminary inquiry into how one might bring the analysis of visual rhetoric into discursive 
analysis, and enrich the examination of the talk about images, with a closer look at their aesthetic and 






Looking as a morally accountable activity 
 
In accounts of the public impact of the death of Alan Kurdi, there has been a tendency to 
assume that, because Twitter and Facebook played an important role in the dissemination of the 
photographs, this was a spontaneous, global, ‘bottom up’ phenomenon, which largely bypassed 
traditional, more institutionalised channels through which news about humanitarian crises are usually 
disseminated. The public’s emotional reaction was seen as the source of the media story, in that the 
traditional media found themselves merely reporting on, or responding to, an unprecedented and 
unforeseen outburst of sympathy.  
However, the analysis of the evolution of the story on Twitter in the hours immediately after 
the images first appeared on the website of the Turkish news agency DHA, suggests otherwise 
(D’Orazio, 2015). Among the first disseminators of the images were journalists and activists 
campaigning on behalf of Syrian refugees, who by the very nature of their social, and professional, 
networks had a comparatively large number of followers. Their activity enabled the images to cascade 
down not just to more users, but also to other influential individuals, among them fellow journalists 
and charity workers, politicians, public figures, and so on, many of whom were similarly eager to turn 
Alan Kurdi’s death into a humanitarian cause (see Fehrenbach & Rododgno, 2015a). This eventually 
ensured the uptake of the images by the mainstream media, including all the major outlets in the UK. 
It was, in fact, only after the images went ‘mainstream’ that they also went ‘viral’ on social networks 
(D’Orazio, 2015).  
The role of the mass media in the global diffusion of the Kurdi images is important because it 
suggests that between the photographs and the public’s emotional response, was a complex process of 
mediation, what Zelizer (2004, p.115) defined as the ‘maze of practices and standards, both explicit 
and implicit, by which photographers, photographic editors, news editors, and journalists decide how 
war can be reduced to a photograph’. In this case, mediation involved working up the images as an 
emotionally relevant, viewable object of humanitarian interest. 
Whenever there is a conflict or natural disaster, newspaper picture desks face an influx of 
troubling imagery, often involving children, which come in via news agencies, or increasingly, social 
networks (Tooth, 2014). Such images present a quandary for mainstream news outlets. Western media 
generally refrain from publishing graphic images of death and suffering, particularly those showing 
children, mainly because of concerns about the dignity of the victims, and to avoid offending the 
sensibilities of the audience. Moreover, dissemination of distressing images leaves the media open to 
accusations that they are engaging in sensationalism, or that they are seeking to profit from the 
disaster by satisfying the public’s morbid curiosity and unsavoury need for ‘atrocity porn’. At the 
same time, not publishing distressing images leaves them exposed to charges that they are concealing 
the ‘truth’ or sanitising the brutal realities of war. News editors as ‘visual gatekeepers’ must therefore 
make, and justify, decisions that will often test the boundaries of responsible, ethical journalism, and 
balance the competing demands of, on the one hand, newsworthiness, and on the other hand, public 
sensibility, and the dignity and privacy of victims.  
Shahira Fahmy (2005) has shown that despite the existence of various codes of practice and 
ethics guidelines, editorial decisions about the use of controversial imagery are inherently subjective, 
and based mainly on journalistic ‘instinct’, political leanings and actual, or anticipated, actions of 
competitors. The images of Alan Kurdi’s body offer a good example of how the media manage 
competing obligations, and how the framing of images, and the emphasis on their emotional 
resonance, becomes inherently tied up with the media’s handling of their own accountability for 
publishing photographs of a dead child.  
As soon as the images of Alan Kurdi’s body appeared on the front covers of newspapers, the 
decision to publish them became part of the news story. Many daily newspapers explicitly 






 We didn’t rush to publish […] We verified the photographs and waited for a full story before 
publication. The enormous poignancy and potential power of the photographs was evident 
from the start. Could they be the images that provided a tipping point? Would public 
sympathy, and perhaps anger at Britain’s role as an apparent bystander in this saga, be moved 
by them? We decided that both of these were highly likely. Those factors had to be balanced 
again [sic] the real shock that some readers would feel. (Paul Johnson, Guardian web editor, 
in Fahey, 2015) 
 
Ultimately, we felt – and still do – that the power to shock is a vital instrument of journalism, 
and therefore democracy. Our motivation wasn’t avaricious; it was to shock the world into 
action, to improve refugee policy – which is why the accompanying editorial and petition had 
clear policy recommendations – and to put pressure on a Prime Minister whose behaviour in 
this crisis has been embarrassing. We hoped some good may yet be salvaged from the 
appalling fate of poor Aylan, and thousands like him. (The Independent, Rajan, 2015), 
 
“the world must see the truth in order to change”. Strong photos “arouse emotions. They show 
beautiful, but also cruel moments. They let us sympathise with other people.” (editorial in the 
German daily Bild, cited in Henley, 2015) 
 
The image is not offensive, it is not gory, it is not tasteless — it is merely heartbreaking, and 
stark testimony of an unfolding human tragedy that is playing out in Syria, Turkey and 
Europe, often unwitnessed […] We have written stories about hundreds of migrants dead in 
capsized boats, sweltering trucks, lonely rail lines, but it took a tiny boy on a beach to really 
bring it home to those readers who may not yet have grasped the magnitude of the migrant 
crisis. [Kim Murphy, the assistant managing editor of The Los Angeles Times, cited in Makey, 
2015] 
 
Evident in these examples is a surprisingly uniform, three-fold argument for why the images 
were printed. First, claims such as that the world ‘must see the truth in order to change’ or that it is the 
task of newspapers to ‘bring it home’, imply that publication was necessary, because of the need to 
draw attention to an important, tragic event, which would otherwise have been overlooked. Second, it 
is assumed that this had to be done through images because of their ‘enormous poignancy and 
potential power’. Crucially, this power lay not in their evidentiary or documentary value, but in their 
ability to ‘arouse emotion’ and ‘shock the world into action’. Third, it was implied that the Kurdi 
images were exceptional, in their horror and emotional impact: they had a unique ability to capture the 
‘magnitude of the migrant crisis’, succeed where ‘stories’ failed, and offer a potential ‘tipping point’. 
The emphasis on the singularity of the Kurdi images is unsurprising, because editorial decisions to 
print graphic images of violence are related to (and can be accounted for by) the perceived scale of the 
event. The more significant or extraordinary a news story, the less important it becomes to ‘hold 
anything back’ (Fahmy, 2005, p.159).  
Identical arguments were to be found even in publications such as The Sun, or the Daily Mail, 
which have traditionally taken a less sympathetic, and occasionally hostile stance towards refugees. 
The Daily Mail stated on its front page that the images ‘could not be more harrowing – but must be 
seen to comprehend the gravity of the migrant crisis engulfing Europe’, while The Sun described the 
images as a ‘heartbreaking symbol of the migrant crisis’ and demanded of the government to ‘solve 
this tragedy’. Therefore, across the political and media spectrum, the initial decision to publish the 
images was presented as controversial, but well thought through, in the public interest, and well 
intentioned. What is more, it was argued that what made these images publishable was not that they 
were not excessively distressing, but on the contrary, that the images must be seen, and disseminated, 
because they are ‘shocking’ and ‘heart-breaking’, and because they can make a difference. As Burns 




photograph of a dead child if that is perceived to do something, or somehow improve the situation that 
otherwise seems overwhelmingly complex’.  
This framing of the images as belonging to the genre of ‘photography of conscience’ (Sontag, 
2003), was not limited to opinion pieces which reflected on the journalistic decision; it featured in the 
descriptions of the very event being reported. The headline on the front page of The Independent on 
the day after the body of Alan Kurdi was discovered, is probably the most illustrative example, 
because it captured, within a single sentence (one character short of the length of a Twitter post), all 
the elements of the aforementioned threefold argument: ‘IF THESE EXTRAORDINARILY POWERFUL 
IMAGES OF A DEAD SYRIAN CHILD WASHED UP ON A BEACH DON'T CHANGE EUROPE'S ATTITUDE TO 
REFUGEES, WHAT WILL?’ (The Independent, September 3, 2015). Kurdi photographs were introduced 
as an extraordinary instance of a category of images that are inherently powerful and have the 
capacity to change attitudes. The account of the images was, therefore, at the same time an account 
for looking at, or publishing them.  
Importantly, it was not just the media that had to manage their moral accountability for 
viewing and disseminating the images, and in doing so negotiate a normatively positive place for 
themselves within the prevailing moral order. Looking at the images of a dead child is, in most 
contexts, an accountable activity. Politicians, journalists, activists, commentators, but also ordinary 
members of the public communicating via social media, all engaged in similar rhetorical work. When 
describing and discussing the images, they too appealed to the link between images, emotion, and 
action, they worked up their feelings about the boy’s death as natural, appropriate, and genuine, and 
accounted for the sincerity of their motives and actions. They endeavoured to show that they gazed at, 
or even shared photographs of a dead child, but that their motives for doing so were benevolent rather 
than self-serving, or perverse.  
And yet, all this accounting contained an important omission. The assumption that visual 
evidence in general, and the Kurdi images in particular, possess superior ability to provoke 
sympathetic concern, was taken for granted. Nowhere were we told why the world needs to ‘see the 
truth in order to change it’, or why images succeed where ‘stories’ fail. Or what made the ‘enormous 
poignancy and potential power’ of these images immediately obvious, and what differentiated them, 
in terms of their emotional power, from other images of dead children. These assumptions, and the 
corresponding sentiments, were all meant to be understood and accepted instinctively, and 
unquestioningly, by the good-hearted audience who, operating within the same framework of meaning 
and moral order, would recognise, and share them. In other words, speakers were relying on, and 
reproducing an ideological common sense about the intrinsic link between images, emotions and 
action.  
 
‘Moving images’ and the practice of spectatorial sympathy  
 
In recent years there have been some, largely speculative, attempts to provide a scientific 
explanation for the association between images, emotion, and social action, drawing on neuroscience 
and evolutionary biology. Joshua Sarinana, a neuroscientist at the Harvard Medical School, writes, for 
instance, that the link between photography, empathy, and altruism is ‘deeply ingrained into the 
architecture of our brain’ and that ‘photography plays a unique role in triggering the network of brain 
regions that underlie empathy’. Therefore, he suggests, photographs ‘undoubtedly appeal to our 
emotions and our yearning to help those in need’ (Sarinana, 2014, emphasis added).   
Such essentialist explanations do not stand up to scrutiny, however. There is nothing 
inevitable, or natural, about human empathy. Children are frequent casualties of war, and images 
depicting their dead bodies are not uncommon. Yet few make it to the front pages of newspapers or 
become part of a humanitarian cause. So, as Gregory (2015) points out, the peculiar thing about 
images depicting the dead, the injured or the needy is not that they provoke a wave of compassion, but 
that they do so rarely. Also, the power of images of suffering is short-lived: according to the European 




Europe, any notable effect on public debate all but disappeared within just ten days (European 
Journalism Observatory, 2015).  
The common-sense assumptions about the power of images can be much more productively 
explored as products of culture rather than nature; as ideological constructs with a distinct social and 
cultural history. In fact, until the 18th Century, the contention that one might feel emotionally moved 
by the suffering of strangers would have seemed distinctly alien: the ‘affective barrier’ between any 
individual and the outside world seldom extended further than the immediate family, friends, or 
community (Friedland, 2012). People were seen as predisposed mainly towards self-interest and self-
love (Fiering, 1976), and while Christian iconography was replete with imagery of suffering, the 
emphasis there was on the inevitability of pain and its redemptive potential, not empathy (Eisenman, 
2007). 
It was only in the 1700s, that the broader project of Enlightenment ushered in a ‘sentimental 
revolution’ which instituted the idea of visually mediated humanitarian concern as an intrinsic, and 
divinely ordained part of human ‘nature’ (Fiering, 1976, p.212, also Arendt, 1963). At that time, a 
new generation of moral philosophers including the Third Earl of Shaftsbury, William Wollaston, 
Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith, offered a view of ‘human nature’ as defined by a fundamental 
moral sense and benevolence towards others (Halttunen, 1995). The emerging doctrine of ‘irresistible 
compassion’ manifested itself as a basic psychological principle, namely that ‘men [sic] irresistibly 
have compassion for the suffering of others and are equally irresistibly moved to alleviate that 
suffering’ (Fiering, 1976, p. 195). This ‘secular sanctification of compassion’ (ibid, p. 198) and its key 
corollary, the view of pain as unacceptable and repulsive, gained wider social and political currency in 
part because it offered an intellectual and moral standpoint from which to advocate humanitarian 
reform, namely, the abolition of slavery, torture, corporal punishment, and other violent practices 
which were now deemed cruel, offensive, uncivilised and ‘unnatural’ (Halttunen, 1995).  
In articulating the idea of a natural humanitarian impulse, writers were heavily influenced by 
John Locke’s emphasis on vision as the primary sense. Viewing the anguish of others was believed to 
enhance psychological proximity to the suffering of strangers and was thus instrumental in triggering 
empathy. The assumed association between compassion and spectatorship, which Dwyer (1987) 
labelled spectatorial sympathy, lead to a proliferation of visual representations of suffering, initially in 
the form of sentimental art. Humanitarian reformers also embraced the assumed power of the visual, 
and supplemented the often sensationalist descriptions of violence with artistic representations of the 
most brutal practices which they sought to outlaw, all with the aim of awakening, and cultivating, 
humanitarian sensibility in the audience.  
The link between humanitarian advocacy and spectatorial sympathy became even more 
prominent in the late 19th and early 20th Century, when the rapid development of photographic 
technology, with its rhetoric of realism and truth, revolutionised how evidence of suffering could be 
presented visually (Fehrenbach & Rodogno, 2015). Photographic images have been at the core of 
humanitarian campaigns ever since, underpinning the ‘manipulative emotional appeals’ which remain 
an inherent feature of organised humanitarianism (Rozario, 2003, p.419).  
In constructing human compassion as instinctive and ‘natural’, 18th Century moral philosophy 
was effectively establishing a new moral order and initiating a new ‘historical stage in the education 
of the emotions’ (Fiering, 1976, p.212). It did so by turning empathy towards strangers into a marker 
of virtue. Compassion became something to be displayed and performed through emotionally-charged 
words and actions (gasping or recoiling when faced with evidence of suffering), through charity work 
and philanthropy, or simply by calling for something to be done. Therefore, spectatorial sympathy 
refers not just to an abstract link between emotion, spectatorship and action, but to a set of discursive 
and embodied practices through which a visually facilitated humanitarian sentiment is articulated, and 
enacted.   
Importantly for the present discussion, the practice of spectatorial sympathy had, from the 
outset, an argumentative texture, driven by a fundamental contradiction: it mandated engagement with 




made the pain of others intolerable, made it also a source of public fascination. This revealed the 
possibility that the pain of others was a potential source of pleasure: the pleasure of one’s own virtue 
manifested in the experience of empathy, or relief provoked by the realisation that one has been 
spared from the observed suffering. Susan Sontag (2003) alluded to a further dimension of the 
pleasures of spectatorship when she wrote that moral satisfaction can be derived both from the act of 
flinching before images of unbearable suffering, and from the knowledge that one can look at the 
image without flinching.  
The prospect of pleasure being derived from watching images of death and suffering, but also 
the emerging concern that indulgence in such material might stifle one’s instinctive humanitarian 
response, or even worse, arouse a perverse affinity for cruelty, shaped the argumentative context 
within which images of suffering have been circulating ever since (Halttunen, 1995). In fact, when 
one reads the late 18th and early 19th Century writing about the natural humanitarian impulse, it is 
striking how closely the arguments align with those in evidence today, in both academic and popular 
discourse. Then, just like today, those participating in the spectacle of suffering ‘filled their writing 
with close descriptions of their own immediate emotional response’ to demonstrate the purity of their 
sensibilities (Halttunen, 1995, p.326), they linked the act of viewing to meaningful action lest they 
should be seen as merely ‘feasting upon the consciousness of our own virtue’ (Barbauld, 1773, p.174), 
or ‘gratifying a morbid appetite’ (Wright, 1846, p.iii). They debated the relationship between ‘feeling’ 
and ‘doing’: talking about what one has seen and how they were personally affected was, just like 
today, intrinsically tied up with the act of adopting a stance, or committing to a cause (Boltanski, 
1999). 
Tracing the history of spectatorial sympathy is important because it suggests that emotional 
displays, verbal or otherwise, that permeated the responses to the images of Alan Kurdi, are 
embedded in culturally specific discourses and practices, which shape both the sources of moral 
accountability associated with the act of looking at an image of a dead child, and the ways of 
managing them. And yet, as we shall see, spectatorial sympathy does not influence just the reading of, 
and responses to, images. It influences also the images themselves; it informs the various 
representational practices and aesthetic conventions that makes some images recognisable icons of 
suffering, and renders some deaths more visible, politically consequential and ‘grievable’ than others 
(Butler, 2007).  
 
Images of suffering children and the aesthetics of humanitarianism 
The central feature of the Kurdi images, from which they draw their symbolic power, is 
undoubtedly that they represent a dead child. Ever since the movement to end the atrocities in the 
Belgian Congo in the 1890s, photographs of suffering or dead children have been a staple ingredient 
of visually mediated compassion (Fehrenbach & Rododgno, 2015a). The coming together of 
spectatorial sympathy, and the 19th century invention, and idealisation, of childhood (and especially 
the motifs of innocence and vulnerability) have encouraged campaigners to develop a distinct 
‘iconography of childhood’ which includes the trope of the lone suffering child, or the child being 
cradled by an adult in the manner of the Pietà (Fehrenbach, 2015, p. 166). There is no doubt that, out 
of several dozen images taken that day on the beach near Bodrum, the two ‘iconic’ images of Alan 
Kurdi’s body, were selected for dissemination because they fitted the established conventions of 
humanitarian photography, and in the knowledge that they would be read as such.  
In fact, the familiar ‘iconography of childhood’ can be said to have influenced the creation of 
the images in the first place. As Zelizer (2004) points out, in today’s highly competitive media 
market, what makes a news image stand out, and more importantly, what makes it memorable and 
durable, ‘defining’ and ‘iconic’ is that it meets certain aesthetic expectations and is recognisably 
symbolic, connotative, dramatic, and vivid. This leads to a reliance on a set of interpretative 
strategies, and familiar visual tropes, including that of the dead child. The point being made here is 




photo-journalistic cliché, but rather that what made that scene worth photographing is that it 
conformed to a set of established conventions, well represented in the history of award-winning news 
photography, or compilations of ‘iconic’, ‘heart-breaking’ images. 
And yet, the image of a dead child does not in itself make a global phenomenon. So, what is it 
about the Kurdi images that made them such a prominent icon of the refugee experience?  
The rhetorical use of visual images of suffering involves a specific moral framing, based on 
what Azoulay (2008, p.25) calls the ‘pragmatics of obligation’. Recipients of the humanitarian 
message are not just expected to care; they are expected to accept responsibility for the problem and 
take appropriate action. The audience must be shamed into doing something to alleviate the observed 
suffering (Ash, 2005). For this moral rhetoric to work in the contemporary political context, both the 
‘problem’ and the ‘solution’ need to be distinctly humanitarian in nature, and ‘we’ (often ‘the west’, 
to whose gaze the victims are exposed) need to be identifiably accountable. 
In the case of the Kurdi images, this rhetoric of shaming is revealed in the location of the 
boy’s body (the beach) and the cause of death (drowning). Had the image been of a child killed by the 
so-called Islamic State, the Syrian Army or Russian air strikes, it would have been much more 
difficult to frame the death in strictly humanitarian terms and invoke the rhetoric of shame. Blame 
would have been attributable to a specific side in the military conflict, rather than the ‘inaction’ of 
those for whom the image was intended. It also would have introduced the option of western military 
action, a controversial proposition in the post-Iraq world characterised by intervention fatigue. The 
fact that Alan Kurdi drowned on Europe’s border, rather than being killed, for instance, on the streets 
of Aleppo, allowed for the geographical, and political, distance to be maintained between the plight of 
the refugees, and its underlying (military) cause. It allowed for the problem to be constituted as 
humanitarian as opposed to military, and it foregrounded the accountability of western governments 
on whose ‘doorstep’ the boy died. Therefore, the image itself reflected, while at the same time 
reinforcing, a particular framing of the refugee crisis, its causes and possible solutions. 
Also, the photographs of Alan Kurdi’s body are inherently ambiguous. On the one hand, they 
are highly graphic in their portrayal of violent death: they show the body of a child that the viewer 
knows is dead. Yet at the same time, the body does not ‘look’ dead. There are no signs of putrefaction 
or bloating, common in cases of drowning, there is no blood or other signs of physical trauma. In fact, 
in responses to the photograph of the body lying face down in the sand, one frequently encounters 
comparisons to a ‘sleeping child’: the posture of the body is said to be reminiscent of the ‘awkward 
sleeping position’ of toddlers (Drainville, 2015, p.47). The sanitised and aestheticized representation 
of death makes the image seem ‘taboo breaking’ – in the context of journalistic conventions that 
generally proscribe the publication of images of dead children – but also inoffensive, because it aligns 
with the sensibilities of an audience accustomed to funereal practices that make the dead look as if 
they are asleep. This ambiguity made the photograph of Alan Kurdi’s body both controversial and 
publishable and, therefore, inherently newsworthy. What is more, the condition of the body itself 
appeals to the sense of shame in the audience: it suggests that the boy had only just died, and 
therefore, that assistance, symbolised by the figure of the Turkish policeman, arrived just a little too 
late. In the best known of the Kurdi images, in which the boy’s body is lying alone, face down in the 
sand, the viewer is effectively invited to look at the boy through the gaze of the first responders, and 
reflect on their culpability for not ‘getting there’ (in terms of responding to the refugee crisis) sooner. 
The ambiguity of the images is important also because it captured the two lenses through 
which the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean is often perceived: the forensic lens, which views dead 
or suffering migrant bodies as evidence of a crime (war crimes, trafficking, but also the western 
governments’ inaction), and the lens of memory whereby the body becomes the ‘reference point for 
mourning and the addressing of trauma’ (Kovras & Robins, 2016). The photograph of the body in the 
sand resembles, at the same time, an artistically unpretentious forensic photograph, which gives it an 
aura of authenticity and referentiality (McCabe, 2015), and a work of art that uses the ‘moral figure of 
the child’ (Malkki, 2010) and the motif of childhood innocence, to capture the tragedy of the refugee 




artistic manipulations of the original photographs created by illustrators and graphic designers, which 
sought to moderate the explicitness of the original photographs, while foregrounding their wider 
symbolism (Drainville, 2015).  
Perhaps most importantly, the images of Alan Kurdi’s body owe their public prominence to 
the fact that they struck a balance between the rhetoric of similarity and difference that underpins 
humanitarian photography. Since its inception, humanitarian imagery has been instrumental in 
representing distant suffering, the anguish of people who are both culturally and geographically 
removed from those to whose gaze they are being subjected. Distance, after all, is what made Alan 
Kurdi’s dead body visible in the first place: no British media outlet would ever have published an 
explicit image of a dead British child washed up on a beach.  
There are two principle reasons for this emphasis on distant suffering. The first and obvious 
reason is that only distant suffering needs to be ‘brought home’ through affecting images. Suffering 
close by is already visible, or perceptible in other ways. The second reason is that historically, 
humanitarian imagery has been instrumental in fostering the ideology of racial and class difference, 
presenting populations in need as ‘passive but pathetic objects capable only of offering themselves up 
to a benevolent, transient gaze’ of those on whose compassion they supposedly depend (Tagg, 1988, 
p.12). The sense of entitlement to watch the suffering of distant others, supposedly for their benefit, is 
inherent in the practice of spectatorial sympathy and the moral order underpinning international 
humanitarianism.  
The distance between the spectator and the suffering victim is never absolute, however. 
Humanitarian mobilisation depends on the process of identification: the distant victim must be made 
to resemble ‘us’ (Douglas, 1994). Thus, in accounting for why they were moved by the death of Alan 
Kurdi, journalists, public figures and users of social media often focused not just on the boy’s pose, 
but also his attire, especially his shoes (Procter & Yamada-Rice, 2015, Tharoor, 2015). This focus on 
shoes was facilitated by the fact that in one of the widely-circulated versions of the image, the angle 
of the shot and the composition of the image made the boy’s feet a salient feature. On a symbolic 
level, the shoes are evocative of childhood innocence, and the fragility and dependency of children. 
Yet, the point here was not that Alan Kurdi was wearing shoes (why wouldn’t a Syrian child wear 
them?) but, rather, that he was wearing shoes (and clothes) like those worn by children in the west. It 
provided a point of visual similarity between a Syrian child and ‘our’ children, and a source of 
identification.  
This kind of identification seems unproblematic at first. Recent work on altruism and social 
identity has shown that people are more likely to help those who resemble them in terms of some 
socially relevant, or salient criterion (e.g. Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). This might 
include a mundane point of similarity, such as someone’s clothing, which acts as an external marker 
of cultural affiliation. However, in the context of the history of humanitarianism, the importance 
attributed to identification has a troubling legacy. For over a century, campaigners seeking to ‘bring 
home’ the suffering of distant peoples have known that, to inspire sympathy, they must make non-
Europeans look more ‘European’. In the 1920s, humanitarian campaigners went as far as to lighten 
the skin of Armenian children to inspire compassion among western audiences (see Fehrenbach & 
Rodogno, 2015). Such extreme practices are uncommon today, but the fact remains that issues of 
racial and cultural similarity and difference still inform the choice of subject of humanitarian 
photography and the reading of images (ibid.). Humanitarian campaigners will choose humanitarian 
causes, and images to represent them, according to these parameters, and draw attention to issues and 
features that they believe will promote identification, and, by extension, enhance empathy.  
This of course does not mean that people reacted emotionally to images of Alan Kurdi’s body 
simply because he resembled a child of European descent, or that they would not have done so if he 
was black or had been wearing attire that explicitly marked him as culturally different. Nor does the 
analysis of the images, their symbolism and ideological message, imply that their capacity to elicit an 
emotional or political response, lies exclusively, and inexorably, in their visual, or aesthetic qualities. 




ideological dimension which is reflected not just in how we make sense of images of suffering or how 
we feel about them, but also in which dead bodies we get to gaze at, get ‘shocked’ by, and care about 




This chapter examined the responses to the images of Alan Kurdi as a manifestation of 
spectatorial sympathy, a practice that shapes the prevailing cultural assumptions about the link 
between images, emotion and political mobilisation, and determines the parameters within which the 
appropriateness of emotional and political responses to images of suffering is negotiated. Being 
shocked, disturbed or saddened by the photograph of a suffering body is not a visceral reaction to a 
tragic event or its technologically mediated representation, but a form of social action. It is a way of 
suffusing the photograph with moral and political significance, redefining the death represented in it 
as an emergency that demands urgent, collective, response, and accounting for the act of looking.  
Spectatorial sympathy, which informed the social life of the Kurdi images, from the moment 
they were taken on the beach in Bodrum, to when they were displayed on millions of computer 
screens and on front covers of newspapers around the world, is inherently multimodal. It is constituted 
not just through avowals of emotions (both verbal and embodied), and the debates about their 
meaning and appositeness, but also through images themselves. The inherent link between what is 
seen and what is felt suggests that in studies of discourse, visual images, and their symbolism deserve 
to be recognised as an object of analysis, and not, as is often the case, a prop used to stimulate talk. 
Focusing simply on what participants say about an image leads us to miss the complex dynamic by 
which that image became visible to them, and instituted as something worth talking about.   
Acknowledging the fact that the visual is an intrinsic part of everyday social and emotional 
life, does not require a break with discursive psychology’s broader intellectual project. Especially in 
the early stages, discursive approaches were defined by intellectual open-mindedness and eclecticism 
that was (and still is) missing from mainstream psychology. The argument was frequently made that 
scholarship (Billig, 1988, Gill, 1996) is as important as a specific method of analysis, especially when 
it comes to the study of ideology. As Billig (1988, p.199-200) put it, in the study of ideological 
phenomena, using ‘intellectual experience’, ‘scholarly judgment’, ‘hunches’ and ‘specialist 
knowledge’ to place specific patterns of thought within longer traditions of explanation, and one 
might add, ways of seeing, is often more illuminating than following ‘formally defined procedures’. 
There is no reason these skills cannot be productively mobilised to explore more fully the interplay 
between verbal and visual rhetoric, especially in terms of how images come to serve ‘as the index of 
an ideological theme’ (Hall, 1981, p.238). Given that contemporary political and media cultures are 
becoming increasingly reliant on both visual communication and emotion, perhaps it is time to 
challenge the ‘hegemony of verbal texts’ (Helmers & Hill, 2004, p.19-20) and consider how words 
and images work together in shaping human experience, and how they inform what we see and feel, 
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